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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 3, 1948, the Supreme Court issued two decisions in four cases
that are now remembered as Shelley v. Kraemer.' In the Shelley cases,
the Supreme Court held that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court's holding-that judicial enforcement of a private right
constitutes state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment-has
generated enough criticism and commentary to fill a small library. There
is, however, a significant aspect of the restrictive covenant litigation that
has not received as much attention. The Supreme Court's decision in the
restrictive covenant cases was the result of a highly organized effort in-
volving more than thirty years of litigation and hundreds of cases. The
conflict which caused the litigation arose from a dramatic population
shift that occurred in the early decades of the twentieth century. The
great migration of black families from rural areas to urban industrial cen-
ters prompted various efforts to establish and maintain racial segregation
in housing. After legislated segregation failed, private covenants became
the primary vehicle for maintaining segregated housing.2
The forces against restrictive covenants consisted of black families in
search of adequate housing, the NAACP, and the lawyers who served on
that organization's legal committee. From 1926 to 1947, the NAACP
and the lawyers fighting against the covenants lost the vast majority of
the hundreds of cases in which they challenged the covenants. By 1944,
The American Law Institute's Restatement of Property, one of the most
influential treatises in the field, endorsed racial covenants as a valid ex-
ception to the general rule against restraints on the alienation of
property.3
In the face of a vast amount of adverse legal precedent, the NAACP
lawyers seemed to know that they would ultimately prevail in the
Supreme Court. Charles Hamilton Houston, who served at various times
as counsel to the NAACP and was dean of Howard University Law
1. The Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), was a consolida-
tion of appeals from two state supreme court decisions: Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679 (Mo.
1946) (involving property located in St. Louis, Missouri) and McGhee v. Sipes, 25 N.W.2d 639
(Mich. 1947) (involving property located in Detroit, Michigan). The Supreme Court decision in
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), represented the consolidation of two cases concerning properties
located in the District of Columbia: Hurd v. Hodge and Urciolo v. Hodge. All four cases are
hereinafter referred to collectively as the restrictive covenant cases.
2. See infra notes 8-20 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
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School and the architect of the NAACP's school desegregation strategy,
devised the restrictive covenant strategy. The covenant strategy involved
an evidentiary demonstration of the relationship of crime and disease to
overcrowded conditions in urban ghettoes, and the role of restrictive cov-
enants in the perpetuation of those problems. This strategy, which made
the victory in Shelley possible, also had a profound influence on the
Supreme Court's attitude toward civil rights litigation. This Article will
explore the origin and development of the covenants,4 and examine ur-
ban housing conditions in the 1930s and 1940s.1 It will review the
NAACP's legal strategy and that organization's coordination of the cov-
enant litigation,6 and it will analyze each of the four cases that eventually
reached the Supreme Court.7
II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF RACIAL COVENANTS
Racially restrictive covenants were prompted, in large measure, by the
great migration of black families from rural areas to northern and mid-
western industrial centers. The migration from field to factory began in
the second decade of the twentieth century and reached its peak during
the Second World War.' One response to the increased presence of black
families in cities was the enactment of municipal ordinances which pro-
hibited these families from owning, renting or otherwise occupying prop-
erty except in specified areas of the cities. The ordinances were promptly
challenged in courts and the Supreme Court ultimately held them uncon-
stitutional in Buchanan v. Warley.9 In Buchanan, the Supreme Court
invalidated a Louisville, Kentucky ordinance. The Court concluded that
racial minorities were protected by the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment from state or municipal legislation that limited
their rights to acquire, use, or dispose of property solely because of
race. 10
After Buchanan, restrictive covenants quickly became the primary
means by which neighborhoods maintained racially segregated housing
patterns. The covenants were either inserted into deeds by real estate
4. See infra notes 8-20 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 24-53 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 54-85 and accompanying text.
8. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
9, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
10. Id.
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developers at the time of construction or prepared by attorneys retained
by neighborhood organizations, executed by individual homeowners, and
recorded in the official real estate records of the city or county in ques-
tion. The covenants typically restricted owners from the lease, sale or
conveyance to, or ownership by, any member of the excluded groups, or
use or occupancy by any member of those groups.11 During the 1920s,
racially restrictive covenants occurred extensively throughout the United
States and courts routinely enforced them when civil actions were filed.12
By 1944, the Restatement of Property recognized racially restrictive cov-
enants as a valid exception to the general prohibition against restraints
on the alienation of property on the ground that "social conditions
render desirable the exclusion of the racial or social group in question."13
The Supreme Court considered the validity of the private covenants in
a 1926 decision, Corrigan v. Buckley.14 Corrigan was based on a cove-
nant executed by a group of District of Columbia homeowners in 1921.
The covenant prohibited the homeowners and their successors from sell-
ing their properties to racial minorities. One of the homeowners subse-
quently violated the agreement by selling his home to a black family.
When a neighboring homeowner sued, the trial court granted an injunc-
tion voiding the sale. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed the injunction on appeal. 5 Relying on the Supreme
Court's reasoning in the Civil Rights Cases, 6 the court of appeals con-
cluded that the fourteenth amendment applied only to actions taken by
states or governmental entities and did not apply "to actions by individu-
als in respect to their property." 7 The court also held that the covenants
did not violate the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the Civil Rights Enforce-
ment Act of 1870 because those statutes could not create any greater
protection than that accorded by the Constitution itself.'"
Plaintiffs sought review of the court of appeals' decision in the
Supreme Court. Although the Supreme Court declined review on juris-
dictional grounds, it issued an opinion in which it agreed with the court
11. The excluded group always included blacks and frequently included Asians, native Ameri-
cans and religious minorities.
12. C. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY 55 (1959).
13. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 406 comment 1 (1944).
14. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
15. 299 F. 899 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
16. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17. 299 F. at 901.
18. Id. at 902.
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of appeals' determination that state action needed to invoke the protec-
tion of the Constitution was not present in Corrigan. The Supreme Court
stated, inter alia, that the fifth amendment "is a limitation only on the
powers of the general government and is not directed against the actions
of individuals."19 The Court also observed that the thirteenth amend-
ment did not create any rights beyond a general prohibition against slav-
ery, and that violations of the fourteenth amendment required some form
of state action. Actions taken by individuals, it said, were beyond the
reach of that amendment. With regard to restrictive covenants, the
Court concluded that "[i]t is obvious that none of these [constitutional]
Amendments prohibited private individuals from entering into contracts
respecting the control and disposition of their own property."2 °  With
the decision in Corrigan, the Supreme Court effectively endorsed the le-
gality of restrictive covenants. During the following twenty-two year pe-
riod, virtually every court that considered a challenge to restrictive
covenants relied on the Corrigan dicta as governing legal authority. As a
consequence, it appeared for several years that racially restrictive cove-
nants would prevail as a mechanism for controlling housing patterns.
III. URBAN HOUSING CONDITIONS IN THE 1930S AND 40s
After Corrigan, the use of racial covenants flourished. In every city
that had a black population of any significance, racial minorities were
confined to specific geographic districts. Despite this disincentive, the
migration of black families to urban centers continued unabated. As a
consequence, the already overcrowded conditions of the urban ghettoes
grew worse. In 1932, for example, the Report on Negro Housing of the
President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership con-
cluded that racial segregation "ha[d] kept the Negro-occupied sections of
cities throughout the country fatally unwholesome places, a menace to
the health, morals and general decency of cities and plague spots for race
exploitation, friction and riots."
21
One of the fundamental problems with the covenants was the severe
space limitations which they created. The areas to which black families
were confined were inadequate to support rapidly growing populations.
Charles Hamilton Houston, one of the attorneys who led the fight against
19. Corrigan, 271 U.S. at 330.
20 Id.
21. PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILDING AND HOME OWNERSHIP, REPORT ON
NEGRO HOUSING 45-46 (1932).
Washington University Open Scholarship
742 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
restrictive covenants, complained bitterly that the covenants operated as
an "invisible wall" which crowded black families into substandard
housing.22
Despite the limitations imposed by the covenants, black home buyers
invariably found ways to circumvent them. The most prevalent device
was the use of a white "strawman" to purchase property. Under this
system, a white buyer would purchase a home, then immediately resell
the property to a black purchaser. The white homeowners in the affected
area would then be required to bear the burden and expense of filing a
civil action to seek enforcement of the covenant. White homeowners also
circumvented the covenants by simply disregarding the covenants and
selling directly to black purchasers. Because the demand for housing in
black communities was far greater than the available supply, white
homesellers frequently obtained substantially higher prices from black
purchasers than they would have received from white buyers. As a re-
sult, despite the elaborate mechanisms that were created to perpetuate
segregated communities, white homeowners and real estate agents had a
significant economic incentive to sell properties to black purchasers. The
influx of black families into urban centers continued throughout the
1920s and 1930s and, with the advent of the Second World War, the
number of blacks migrating to urban centers increased dramatically.
During the war, the defense industry created thousands of new jobs lo-
cated in or near large cities.2" As more minorities moved to the urban
centers, the demand for housing increased, causing conditions in ghettoes
to deteriorate rapidly. Because of the increased demand, homes subject
to covenants were sold to black families. White homeowners responded
with lawsuits and, by 1946, at least 100 civil actions were pending.
IV. THE NAACP's ORCHESTRATION OF THE RESTRICTIVE
COVENANT CASES
The NAACP had from its inception in 1909 sought to combat racial
discrimination. Discrimination in housing was one of several areas on
which the organization focused. In 1917, the organization successfully
challenged municipal ordinances which sought to legislate segregated
housing,2 4 but suffered a major setback when the Corrigan court en-
22. G. MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS (1983).
23. See G. MYRDAL, supra note 8.
24. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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dorsed the validity of private covenants in 1926.25 Prominent white law-
yers who were members of the NAACP board argued Buchanan and
Corrigan, but the NAACP soon realized that utilizing white attorneys in
such visible roles undermined the message the organization was attempt-
ing to convey. As a result, in the early 1930s, the organization began to
actively recruit black lawyers to serve on its legal committee. In 1935,
NAACP executive secretary Walter White recruited a black attorney,
Charles Hamilton Houston, then dean of Howard University Law
School, to serve full time as the organization's legal counsel.26
The NAACP's selection of Houston was an unusually wise choice for
several reasons. He had impeccable educational credentials, having grad-
uated from Amherst College with honors after being elected to Phi Beta
Kappa. Houston served as an officer in World War I, and later enrolled
in Harvard Law School, where he was the first black student elected to
serve on the editorial board of the Harvard Law Review.27 After gradua-
tion from Harvard, Houston studied law for a year in Spain, at the Uni-
versity of Madrid. He practiced for a brief period with his father in
Washington, D.C., and was then appointed by Mordecai Johnson, presi-
dent of Howard University, to serve as the vice-dean of Howard Univer-
sity Law School in 1929.28
During his tenure at Howard University, Houston transformed the law
school from an unaccredited part time program to a fully accredited in-
stitution.29 In addition to raising standards and improving the program
of instruction, Houston served as the mentor for a generation of black
lawyers. Houston was a visionary who believed that the law could be
used as an effective weapon to fight racial discrimination. He also be-
lieved that lawyers should be "social engineers." 30
During the reconstruction period which followed the Civil War, the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection had been subverted to deny
25. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926).
26. G. McNEIL, supra note 22, at 86-105.
27. See law review editorial board at 35 HARV. L. REV. 950 (1922). These educational accom-
plishments would be impressive at any time but to be fully appreciated, Houston's achievements
must be viewed in light of the enormous educational barriers that existed for black students in the
second decade of the twentieth century.
28. The title is misleading because Houston actually functioned as the dean but refused the title
as a symbolic protest to the low salaries paid to law professors. G. MCNEIL, supra note 22, at 46-56.
29. See R. LOGAN, How. UNIVERSITY: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS (1969).
30. G. McNEIL, supra note 22, at 76. See also Read, The Contribution of Charles Hamilton
Houston to American Jurisprudence, 30 HOWARD L.J. 803-08 (1988) (tracing Houston's legal philos-
ophy to the sociological school of jurisprudence).
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black Americans full citizenship rights. With the Civil Rights Cases31 in
1883, and Plessy v. Ferguson 32 in 1896, the Supreme Court embraced the
legal fiction of the separate but equal doctrine. Houston believed that the
inequities sanctioned by those decisions could be successfully challenged
through innovative litigation. When he was counsel to the NAACP in
the late 1930s, Houston developed an "equalization" strategy under
which a series of lawsuits were filed demanding that state and local gov-
ernments provide educational facilities for black students equal to those
provided to white students. Houston envisioned eventual school desegre-
gation because he believed that states could not afford the financial bur-
den of truly equal dual systems.33 Houston's restrictive covenant
litigation strategy involved the use of sociological and other scientific
studies to demonstrate the relationship of overcrowded and substandard
housing conditions-perpetuated by racial covenants-to poor health
and crime.
When Houston accepted the position of special counsel to the
NAACP, a formidable network had developed across the nation through
three separate institutions: Howard University Law School, the
NAACP's legal committee, and the National Bar Association. 34 During
the 1930s and 1940s, Howard University was the only institution that
was training a significant number of black lawyers. 35 Consequently, a
substantial number of black attorneys during that period shared an old
school tie grounded in Houston's philosophy. After they completed their
studies and established themselves as practicing attorneys in communi-
ties across the country, Howard graduates joined or established black bar
associations which served as affiliate chapters of the National Bar
Association.
During the same period, the NAACP established local chapters in cit-
ies and towns throughout the nation. Because of the legal focus of the
NAACP, black attorneys usually served in leadership roles, or were
31. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); M. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 1925-1950 (1987).
34. The National Bar Association had been established in 1925 because the American Bar As-
sociation refused to admit black attorneys. Similarly, most of the local bar associations denied ad-
mission to black attorneys. Houston was a member of the National Bar Association and one of the
founders of the Washington Bar Association, the District of Columbia's affiliate of the National Bar
Association. See Smith, The Black Bar Association and Civil Rights, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 651
(1982).
35. Washington, History and Role of Black Law Schools, 18 How. L.J. 385 (1974).
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otherwise closely associated with the local chapters. By the 1940s, the
NAACP, the National Bar Association, and the local chapters of those
organizations, together with Howard University Law School, had formed
a vast network of interlocking civil rights organizations. This network
had the pivotal role in the legal campaign against racially restrictive
covenants.3 6
V. MIXED SIGNALS FROM THE SUPREME COURT
The first crack in the invisible walls occurred in 1940, when the
Supreme Court decided Hansberry v. Lee.37 Hansberry overruled an Illi-
nois Supreme Court decision that had affirmed the validity of a restric-
tive covenant on Chicago property. The Court's decision did not reach
the constitutional questions presented. Rather, the Court held, on proce-
dural grounds, that the Hansberrys were not estopped from challenging a
covenant that was the subject of an earlier lawsuit. Despite the Supreme
Court's failure to address any constitutional issues, the attorneys in-
volved in restrictive covenant litigation were encouraged by the favorable
decision in Hansberry.a8
There was another positive signal in the campaign against restrictive
covenants when Charles Houston prevailed in the 1942 case of Hundley
v. Gorewitz.39 In Hundley, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit declined to enforce a restrictive covenant.' The decision
was based on the "changed circumstances" principle, which authorized
courts to deny injunctive relief when the character of the neighborhood
had changed to such an extent that enforcement of the covenant would
be futile.4 1 Defendants were able to show that a substantial number of
black families already resided in the area in question.
The campaign against restrictive covenants suffered a setback in 1945
36. Houston resigned from his NAACP position in 1938 and returned to private practice in
Washington, D.C., but he continued to work closely with the NAACP until his death in 1950. He
was succeeded by one of his former students whom he had recruited to work with him in the
NAACP's legal department in New York. Accordingly, when he was just 30 years old, Thurgood
Marshall became the head of the NAACP's legal department. G. MCNEIL, supra note 22, at 131-56.
37. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
38. The Hansberrys were the parents of playwright Lorraine Hansberry whose play, A Raisin
In The Sun, was inspired by the Hansberry litigation. L. HANSBERRY, To BE YOUNG, GIFTED AND
BLACK (1958).
39. 132 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
40. Id. at 25.
41. Id. at 24.
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when the Supreme Court denied a request for a writ of certiorari in Mays
v. Burgess.42 Mays involved a challenge to a restrictive covenant on prop-
erty in the District of Columbia. 43 The court of appeals had affirmed the
validity of the covenant, but one of the judges on the panel issued a force-
ful dissent. The dissenting opinion argued, inter alia, that the shortage
of housing for black families in the District of Columbia was so severe
that the restrictive covenants were contrary to public policy. 44 The dis-
sent argued further that "our Corrigan decision was probably unsound
when it was rendered," and that the court should not "enforce a pri-
vately adopted segregation plan which would be unconstitutional if it
were adopted by a legislature."' 45 A petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed later in the Supreme Court. One of the attorneys involved, William
Hastie, was confident that the Supreme Court would grant the petition
based on the persuasive reasoning of the dissenting opinion.41 Hastie's
prediction proved unduly optimistic. The Supreme Court's order deny-
ing certiorari indicated that Hastie and his colleagues had secured only
two of four votes needed-Justices Rutledge and Murphy. Although the
Supreme Court's action was a disappointing defeat, many of the NAACP
lawyers also interpreted it as a favorable indication that only two addi-
tional votes were needed to secure a review by the Supreme Court.
VI. THE NAACP's CHICAGO CONFERENCE
Shortly after the certiorari petition was denied in Mays, the NAACP
convened a series of conferences to discuss the pending covenant cases
and to develop an overall strategy for securing a victory in the Supreme
Court. It held the first meeting in Chicago in July, 1945.41 William Has-
tie, who was by then governor of the U.S. Virgin Islands, presided at the
meeting. Thurgood Marshall, the NAACP's special counsel, explained
42. 147 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945).
43. Id. at 869. George E.C. Hayes, Leon A. Ransom, and James A. Cobb, the attorneys who
represented the black family during the Mays trial, had served as Howard Law faculty under Charles
Houston. Thurgood Marshall, the NAACP's legal counsel, William H. Hastie, who was then dean
of Howard's Law School (and was later appointed by President Truman to serve on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit) and Spottswood Robinson (another Howard Law
School alumnus) became involved in Mays at the appellate level. G. WARE, WILLIAM HASTIE:
GRACE UNDER PRESSURE (1984),
44. 147 F.2d at 876-77 (Edgerton, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 875-76.
46. G. WARE, supra note 43.
47. Minutes of the NAACP Chicago Conference (July 9-10, 1945), Records of the NAACP,
Group II Box 133 (Library of Congress) [hereinafter Minutes].
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the purpose of the meeting. Thirty-five persons attended; most of these
were attorneys involved in restrictive covenant litigation.
Charles Houston spoke of his experiences with restrictive covenant
cases, and urged the attorneys present to adopt his strategy. He stressed
that a defense which admitted that the purchasers were black and that
the racial covenants existed made the tasks of the white homeowners'
attorneys far too easy. Houston suggested instead that defense counsel
deny that the purchasers were black. Houston explained that requiring
plaintiffs' attorneys to prove the race of the defendants allowed the de-
fense counsel to expose the irrational nature of the plaintiffs' assumptions
about race during cross-examination. Houston also recommended the
use of expert testimony by sociologists and economists who could testify
about the effects of covenants on the overcrowded conditions of black
communities and the relationship of overcrowding and substandard
housing to infant mortality and crime.48 These recommendations, which
also involved challenging racial assumptions, introducing economic and
sociological studies prepared by experts,4 9 and the assertion of constitu-
48. Id.
49. Although the use of sociological data in civil rights cases has been criticized by several
commentators, the relevant authorities indicate that evidence of this nature was considered as early
as the nineteenth century in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). It was in Muller v. Oregon,
208 US. 412 (1907), however, that social science was explicitly relied upon, as expert testimony, in
the determination of a legal issue. See, e.g., Driessen, The Wedding of Social Science and the Courts:
Is the Marriage Working?, 64 Soc. Sci. Q. 476 (1983). Muller was influenced to a great extent by the
appellee's brief, prepared by Louis Brandeis, in which he introduced authoritative extralegal data in
order to demonstrate "the reasonableness of the specific law at issue and the relationship of the
regulation to the needs of society." Doro, The Brandeis Brief, 11 VAND. L. REV. 783, 789 (1958)
(emphasis in original). In the Muller opinion, Justice Brewer quoted extensively from materials
contained in the 104-page Brandeis brief which consisted of a two-page discussion of law and facts,
while the remaining 102 pages outlined an argument supported by citations to various social science
treatises. Id. at 792. Thus, process was determined, not just by consideration of abstract legal con-
cepts, but also on the basis of the social and economic implications of the law at issue. Id. at 793.
Such contextual considerations have remained a valid approach universally applicable in many dif-
ferent types of litigation on a variety of issues. See, e.g., Colquitt, Judicial Use of Social Science
Evidence at Trial, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 51-84. Examples of judicial issues presented to the Supreme
Court that were influenced by sociological evidence include: capital punishment, Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976); employment discrimination, International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977); pornography, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); venire size, Williams v.
Florida, 339 U.S. 78 (1970); and venire selection, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). In
addition to expert testimony, authenticated scholarly writings can be introduced as evidence in
nearly all jurisdictions, for use in the cross-examination of experts or as supportive materials for
their expressed opinions. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 208 at 900 (1984). As
early as 1857, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted the rule that written scientific works are admis-
sible as substantive evidence, Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857), and cited, as author-
ity for this proposition, a Wisconsin ruling from eight years earlier, Luning v. State, 2 Pin. 284, 1
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tional and common-law defenses, were the framework upon which the
restrictive covenant cases were ultimately won in the Supreme Court.
At the time of the Chicago meeting, two of the four cases that the
Supreme Court would ultimately hear were pending in lower courts.
Furthermore, attorneys who handled the trials of all four cases attended
the conference: William Graves and Francis Dent represented the de-
fendants in the Detroit case;" ° George Vaughn represented the Shelley
family in St. Louis;"1 and Charles Houston represented the defendants in
the two District of Columbia cases.52 At the conclusion of the confer-
ence, Thurgood Marshall closed with a promise that the NAACP would
devote additional attention and resources to restrictive covenant
litigation.53
VII. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CASES
The network of interests supporting restrictive covenants in Washing-
ton, D.C. was formidable. The Washington Real Estate Board had
adopted a provision in its code of ethics which prevented its members
from selling property located in a white area of the city to black families.
Violators lost their membership in the board. Additionally, the Wash-
ington Evening Star maintained a policy of refusing to print advertise-
ments offering restricted property for sale to black people. The paper
enforced this policy through its cooperation with the Real Estate Board,
whose public affairs committee determined whether an address was
within a restricted area. This committee, in turn, consulted the citizens'
association for the area in question.54 As a result, the sixty-nine citizens'
associations in Washington, D.C. exercised the final veto power over
what housing could be advertised and sold to black purchasers. 55
In 1944, James Hurd and his wife purchased a home at 116 Bryant St.
Chand. 178 (Wis. 1849). Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence also provides a method for the
admission of scientific treatises as substantive evidence. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
50. See discussion of Detroit case infra at notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
51. See discussion of St. Louis case infra at notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
52. See discussion of District of Columbia cases infra at notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
53. Minutes, supra note 47.
54. C. VosE, supra note 12.
55. This aggregate of power, Le., the real estate board, the leading newspaper, and the citizens'
associations, clearly establishes that .the covenants were not private agreements between consenting
parties. They were, in reality, the result of the activities of organized forces which would have been
unconstitutional under Buchanan, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) if the municipal government had performed
the same functions.
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N.W., Washington, D.C. Although the surrounding area in northwest
Washington had, by then, a substantial black population, the home
purchased by the Hurds was subject to a covenant prohibiting the prem-
ises from being "rented, leased, transferred, or conveyed unto any Negro
or colored person." In October of 1944, the white residents of the neigh-
borhood filed a petition seeking to evict the Hurds from their home.
During the pendency of the Hurd case, three more houses on Bryant
Street were sold to black families. As a consequence, a second action was
filed against the black purchasers of the Bryant properties and Raphael
Urciolo, a lawyer and realtor who frequently sold homes located in white
neighborhoods to black families.
Charles Hamilton Houston represented the defendants in both cases.
During the trial, Houston employed the tactics he had described during
the Chicago conference. Upon direct examination, Hodge, a white resi-
dent of the neighborhood, testified that blacks were undesirable neigh-
bors and that she would prefer a white neighbor to a black neighbor
under any circumstance. During cross-examination, Houston asked if
the same would be true even if the black person carefully maintained his
home and had no racially identifying features. Hodge responded that it
would not matter. Houston then asked whether the same would be true
if the hypothetical white homeowner allowed the property to deteriorate
and had just been released from prison. The questions continued in this
manner; by the time Houston completed his examination, Hodge was
embarrassed and flustered because the questions and answers highlighted
the absurdity of her prejudices.56
Another of Houston's tactics involved the use of expert testimony.
This tactic, originally based on the changed circumstances principle,
would ultimately prove to be the most significant influence in the restric-
tive covenant litigation.5 7 To support the argument that the racial com-
position of the neighborhood had changed to such an extent that
enforcement of the racial covenant would be futile, Houston offered the
testimony of E. Franklin Frazier, a distinguished black sociologist."8 De-
spite the repeated objections of plaintiffs' attorneys, Frazier was able to
testify that the Bryant Street neighborhood had undergone changes in
racial composition. Frazier also testified to the negative effects of over-
56, C. VOSE, supra note 12, at 75-100.
57. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. See also II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 9.39 (1952).
58 Frazier was, at that time, chairman of Howard University's sociology department.
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crowded housing conditions on the District of Columbia's black commu-
nity and the covenants' role in the perpetuation of those conditions.5 9
When Houston concluded his defense, he had revealed the plaintiffs'
irrational racial attitudes and had exposed the network of interests which
cooperated to enforce segregated housing patterns in the District of Co-
lumbia. Houston also had established that the racial composition of the
Bryant Street neighborhood had changed. He presented evidence dem-
onstrating the severe problems caused by the overcrowded housing con-
ditions in the black areas of Washington and the relationship of
restrictive covenants to those conditions. The trial court was unper-
suaded, however, and entered judgment for the plaintiffs, setting aside
the sale to the black defendants.60
Houston appealed both cases to the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, where they were consolidated under the style Hurd
v. Hodge.61 With one judge dissenting, the court held that it was bound
by twenty-five years of precedent in which racially restrictive covenants
had been upheld in the District of Columbia. The changed conditions
argument was rejected because "the infiltration of four colored families"
was not sufficient to justify the imposition of the doctrine. 62 Relying on
the Restatement of Property's endorsment of racially restrictive cove-
nants, 63 the court of appeals also rejected Houston's argument that the
covenants were an impermissible restraint on the alienation of property.
A dissent filed in Hurd echoed, in stronger language, the dissenting
opinion filed by the same judge two years earlier in Mays.64 The dissent
argued that the covenants were inequitable and unreasonable restraints
on the alienation of property, were contrary to public policy, and were
prohibited by both the Civil Rights Act and the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. 65 To support this conclusion, the dissent contended
that black citizens "have a constitutional right to buy and use . ..
whatever real property they can without direct government interference
59. C. VOSE, supra note 12, at 75-100.
60. Id. Houston had also requested that the trial judge recuse himself because he resided on
property subject to a racial covenant. This request was denied but the parties involved assumed that
this was the reason that three Justices recused themselves when the case reached the Supreme Court.
G. McNEIL, supra note 22, at 156.
61. 162 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
62. Id. at 235.
63. Id.
64. 147 F.2d 869, 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945).
65. 162 F.2d at 235 (Edgerton, J., dissenting).
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based on race."6 6 The judge also asserted that state action was involved
because "[r]estrictive covenants are not self executing. '6 7 The powers of
the state were invoked by virtue of the courts' enforcement of the cove-
nants. In the dissent's view, the court's inquiry should have been
"whether a court of the United States has the constitutional power to
cancel deeds [solely] because the buyers are Negroes." 68 The dissent also
claimed that the majority's ruling violated the fifth amendment and the
Civil Rights Act since nothing was "alleged for or against appellants ex-
cept their color.",6
9
In Hurd, another covenant case had been lost at the appellate level but
had generated a compelling dissent. A court of appeals judge had
adopted virtually all of Houston's arguments and had relied heavily on
sociological studies to support his views. The dissent evinced judicial
sympathy to the arguments, even though the majority believed that it
was bound by precedent affirming the validity of the covenants. From
this decision and the St. Louis and Detroit cases, 70 one can see that once
the courts began to acknowledge the impact of restrictive covenants on
urban housing conditions, they were not far from recognizing that the
covenants should no longer be enforced.
VIII. THE ST. Louis CASE
The Shelley family was part of the black migration which reached its
zenith during the Second World War. The Shelleys moved to St. Louis
from Mississippi in 1939. A modest man with a very limited education,
J.D. Shelley was hard working and thrifty. By 1944, Shelley was em-
ployed at a government owned munitions factory and had saved enough
money to make a down payment on a home. The housing conditions in
St. Louis at that time were the same as those in every other urban indus-
trial center. The black citizens of St. Louis were confined primarily to a
very small district which was located in an area immediately west of the
Mississippi river. Although the housing was substandard and the over-
crowded conditions were a breeding ground for crime and poor health,
rents were higher there than in comparable all-white areas.
The property the Shelleys purchased was located at 4600 Labadie Ave-
66. Id. at 238.
67. Id. at 239.
68. Id. at 238.
69. Id.
70. See infra notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
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nue. Robert A. Bishop, the black minister of the Shelleys' church, drove
the Shelleys by the property. After the Shelleys indicated an interest in
purchasing the home, Bishop, who also dabbled in real estate, arranged a
sale through a white intermediary realtor. Bishop's intermediary negoti-
ated a sale to a straw purchaser who later transferred title to Bishop.
Bishop purchased the property for $4,700 and immediately resold the
property to the Shelleys for $5,700. A black realtor, James Bush, acted
as the agent for the Shelleys. When the Shelleys took possession of the
property on October 9, 1945, they were unaware of the existence of the
restrictive covenant. Consequently, they were quite surprised when they
were served with a lawsuit seeking their eviction on October 10th.
The opposing forces in the Kraemer v. Shelley litigation were the white
homeowners belonging to the Marcus Avenue Improvement Association
pitted against a group of black real estate brokers led by James Bush.
The Kraemers were selected to serve as plaintiffs, but the case was fi-
nanced by the Marcus Avenue homeowners' association. The black real
estate brokers financed the Shelleys' defense, and they retained the serv-
ices of a black St. Louis attorney, George Vaughn, to represent the
Shelleys.
The covenant at issue in Shelley was executed in 1911. It provided
that, for fifty years following the date of execution, the properties subject
to the covenant could not be "occupied by any person not of the Cauca-
sian race."71 When Kraemer v. Shelley came to trial, Vaughn argued that
the covenant was defective because it contained faulty property descrip-
tions and had not been executed by all of the property owners. Vaughn
also raised the changed conditions defense and called witnesses who testi-
fied that a number of black families already resided in the neighborhood.
Vaughn further claimed that the covenant violated the Missouri Consti-
tution, the United States Constitution and the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
Vaughn's witnesses testified about overcrowded conditions within St.
Louis' black district and the effects of overcrowding on health and crime.
After two days of hearings, the trial court ruled that the covenant was
defective because it had not been signed by all of the property owners to
which it purported to apply.
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed the
trial court's decision.72 The Missouri Supreme Court held that the signa-
71. Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Mo. 1946).
72. Id. at 683.
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tures of all of the property owners were not required because the cove-
nant was limited to the properties whose owners had actually executed
the 1911 covenant. The court also held that the exclusion of certain par-
cels from the covenant's coverage did not affect the agreement's validity
because there was never any intent to cover the excluded parcels.73 The
court stated that covenants did not violate public policy because "agree-
ments restricting property from being transferred to or occupied by Ne-
groes have been consistently upheld by the courts of this state."74 Citing
the Mays ruling, the court also held that "the restriction does not contra-
vene the guarantees of civil rights of the Constitution of the United
States."75 Finally, with regard to the detrimental effects of overcrowded
housing, the court observed that "such living conditions bring deep con-
cern to everyone... but their correction is beyond the authority of the
courts."76
In this decision, the Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged the
deplorable conditions that existed in the St. Louis ghetto, but stated that
courts did not have the authority to take remedial actions. The court's
expression of "deep concern" illustrates that the courts were unable to
ignore expert testimony showing a nexus between substandard housing
conditions and poor health and crime. Once courts were persuaded that
the connection existed, it became increasingly difficult for them to deny
the critical role that restrictive covenants played in perpetuating the
problem. Thus, although the forces against restrictive covenants contin-
ued to lose in the courts, their fight was gaining momentum.
IX. THE DETROIT LITIGATION
In 1935, the owners of properties located in a Detroit subdivision exe-
cuted an agreement providing that properties located within the subdivi-
sion "shall not be used or occupied by any person or persons except those
of the Caucasian race."77 Ten years later, twenty-one property owners
initiated a civil action, Sipes v. McGhee,78 to evict the McGhees, a black
family who had purchased a home in the subdivision.
The McGhees sought the assistance of the Detroit branch of the
73. Id. at 681-82.
74. Id. at 682.
75, Id.
76. Id. at 683.
77, Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W.2d 639, 640 (Mich. 1947).
78. Id.
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NAACP. Two Detroit attorneys, Willis Graves and Francis Dent, un-
dertook their representation. 79 During the trial, Graves and Dent devel-
oped what by then had become the standard NAACP defense. They
claimed that the covenant violated public policy and that it was unconsti-
tutional under the Michigan and United States Constitutions. They also
raised a new defense: that the covenant was unenforceable because the
definition of the class affected-non-Caucasians-was unduly vague.
The tactics used at the trial were similar to those employed by Hous-
ton during the District of Columbia litigation. The defense attorneys
challenged the plaintiffs' assumptions about race. The technical require-
ments concerning execution and the recording of the covenants were also
questioned, 0 and extensive sociological data was introduced which
demonstrated the effects of overcrowded housing on Detroit's black com-
munity. At the conclusion of the trial, however, a judgment was entered
for the plaintiffs.
The defendants appealed the trial court's decision. The NAACP's na-
tional office had become involved at the appellate level and, by the time
the case reached the Michigan Supreme Court, support for the McGhees
extended even further. Amicus briefs supporting the McGhees were filed
by the Detroit section of the National Jewish Conference, the Detroit
chapter of the American Lawyer's Guild, the United Automobile Work-
ers, the National Bar Association and the National Bar Association's De-
troit affiliate, the Wolverine Bar Association.
The court, sitting en banc, affirmed the validity of the covenants. 8 1 It
dismissed almost summarily the technical challenge to the signatures.
The court appeared to be concerned about the public policy argument.
In an awkward attempt to reconcile conflicting principles, however, the
court held that, although public policy of the state of Michigan did not
favor racial discrimination, it permitted "restrictions on the use and oc-
cupancy of real property."82 The McGhees had also argued that judicial
enforcement of restrictive covenants constituted unlawful state action
under the fourteenth amendment. The Michigan court responded that
such an interpretation would deny the plaintiffs equal protection under
79. Willis Graves and Francis Dent served on the NAACP's national legal committee, and
Dent had attended Amherst College with Charles Houston.
80. The McGhees claimed that 80% of the homeowners had not executed the covenant because
the certificate of the official witness for one of the signers was defective. This defect, they argued,
invalidated the property owner's signature. 25 N.W.2d at 641.
81. Id. at 638.
82. Id. at 643.
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the law,83 and would also prevent them from enforcing their private con-
tracts. As for the sociological studies presented during the trial, the
Michigan Supreme Court did find these "arguments based on the factual
statements pertaining to questions of public health, safety, and delin-
quency strong and convincing." 84 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the controlling legal precedent compelled it to affirm the validity of
the covenant.
The McGhee decision demonstrates the extent to which the momen-
tum against the covenants had grown. The cause of the Missouri
Supreme Court's "deep concern" in Kraemer v. Shelley had become
"strong and convincing" in McGhee. Furthermore, by the time the case
reached the Michigan Supreme Court, the black families were supported
not only by the NAACP and black bar associations, but by Jewish orga-
nizations and organized labor. For perhaps the first time, active opposi-
tion to restrictive covenants extended beyond black organizations.
Clearly, the court was troubled by the circumstances created by the cove-
nants. The opinion contains a lengthy passage in which the court's obli-
gations to equity and justice were weighed against the court's duty to
follow established precedent.85 Although precedent prevailed, the
court's opinion shows that Houston's strategy, especially the sociological
data, was having a measurable effect on the courts' deliberations in re-
strictive covenant cases.
X. THE ST. LOUIS FORCES LOSE PATIENCE
In January, 1947, the NAACP convened another meeting of black
leaders, this time at Howard University. Several of the attorneys in-
volved in restrictive covenant litigation attended. 6 During the meeting,
the attorneys agreed that they should seek review by the Supreme Court,
but based on the certiorari denial just two years earlier in Mays, they felt
83. The court did not explain how the white homeowners would have been denied equal protec-
tion of the law. This may have been a confusion of equal protection requirements with due process
principles.
84. 25 N.W.2d at 644.
85. Id. at 645.
86. The conferees included Francis Dent and Willis Graves, the attorneys for the McGhees in
the Detroit case, Spottswood Robinson, who had served as Houston's co-counsel in the appeal of the
District of Columbia cases, George Hayes and Governor William Hastie, the defense attorneys in
Mays, Thurgood Marshall, James Nabrit, Loring Moore (Moore had handled Hansberry), Arthur
Shores, Vertner Tandy, Robert Carter, Mary Wynn Perry, Franklin Williams, C. Alphonso Jones,
Edward Lovett, Mr. Hall and Andrew Weinberger. Minutes of the Conference on Restrictive Con-
venants, Howard University, Washington, D.C. (January 25, 1947).
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that care should be taken to identify the appropriate case. The conferees
agreed that the ideal record should include testimony of an economist
concerning the effects of the covenants on housing availability, testimony
by a sociologist showing the adverse effects of overcrowded housing con-
ditions, maps showing the effects of restrictive covenants on housing pat-
terns, and evidence concerning the extensive number of pending
restrictive covenant cases. 8
7
The attorneys also discussed the growing number of restrictive cove-
nant cases, the increased opposition to the covenants, and the enhanced
public awareness of the problem. Although nearly all of the cases had
been lost, the conferees apparently sensed a changing climate and seemed
confident that they would ultimately prevail in the Supreme Court. At
the conclusion of the conference, the attorneys decided that they would
allow additional cases to develop before filing a petition for certiorari in
any of the pending cases. They agreed that prior to any actions before
the Supreme Court, the group would "meet once more and discuss any
other decisions which have come down in the meantime to determine
what action we will take."8 8
George Vaughn did not attend the Howard University meeting but the
members of the St. Louis Real Estate Brokers Association were deter-
mined to pursue the Shelley case. The St. Louis group became increas-
ingly impatient with what it perceived to be uncertainties and delays.
The Shelleys and their supporters had attempted to work in concert with
the NAACP, yet, in their view, little progress had been made. George
Vaughn had contacted Charles Houston shortly after the adverse deci-
sion issued by the Missouri Supreme Court, but Houston had declined
Vaughn's request for assistance, based on the demands of a heavy work-
load. Frustrated by the delays, the Real Estate Brokers Association di-
rected Vaughn to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme
Court. Vaughn filed a petition in April, 1947, without advising the
NAACP. The request was granted in June. 89 After learning that certio-
rari had been granted in Shelley v. Kraemer, Thurgood Marshall hastily
prepared a writ of certiorari for McGhee. Certiorari was eventually
granted in that case as well as the District of Columbia cases.
In July, 1947, a letter was sent to the St. Louis Chapter of the NAACP
by the Real Estate Brokers Association requesting financial assistance in
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 331 U.S. 803 (1947).
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carrying the Shelley case forward.9' The local branch sent the letter to
the national office in New York. 9 The next month, Thurgood Marshall
responded, stating that the request should be taken up at the September
meeting in New York. Marshall also noted that George Vaughn had not
cooperated to his satisfaction.92 David Grant, president of the St. Louis
branch, was angered by the response from the NAACP's national office.
Some of the tension probably resulted because a few of the attorneys in-
volved in the restrictive covenant cases privately thought that Vaughn
should not be allowed to argue Shelley in the Supreme Court. They were
aware that Vaughn had handled restrictive covenant cases in St. Louis,
but they considered his experience in appellate matters too limited for the
Supreme Court. They also felt that he lacked the sophistication and skill
necessary to master the complexities of restrictive covenant litigation and
that he was not sufficiently versed in the sociological materials that they
considered crucial to the litigation.
The St. Louis forces stood behind Vaughn. A series of curt letters
were then exchanged between Thurgood Marshall, James Bush and
David Grant. Marshall indicated that the $1,000 that had been offered
to support the Shelley litigation was conditioned upon coordination of
the Supreme Court briefs. James Bush believed that Marshall wanted
Vaughn to step aside, but he admitted in a letter to Marshall that his
sense of ethics would not permit him to require Vaughn to "step aside
and let someone else run the show."93 Bush made an unsuccessful trip to
the NAACP's national office in an attempt to resolve his differences with
Marshall, but tensions eventually eased and David Grant later received
the national office's permission to initiate a local fundraising campaign.
XI. THE NEW YORK CITY CONFERENCE
In July, 1947, Thurgood Marshall called for a conference of the vari-
ous individuals and groups involved in the campaign against restrictive
covenants.9 4 The conference was held in New York City in September.
90. Letter from Real Estate Brokers Association to St. Louis branch of the NAACP (July 11,
1947).
91, Letter from David Grant, president of the St. Louis NAACP, to Thurgood Marshall (July
30, 1947).
92. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to David Grant (Aug. 1, 1947).
93. Letter from James Bush to Thurgood Marshall (Sept. 19, 1947).
94. [W]e are calling a conference of lawyers who have worked on these cases with us and
lawyers for various organizations interested in the problem .... We particularly urge that
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Houston presided over the meeting,9 announcing that certiorari had
been granted in Shelley and McGhee.
The attorneys handling the cases summarized the facts of each case
and the issues presented.96 The conferees then turned to a discussion of
the sociological data. They discussed a New York study of the effects of
restrictive covenants in three New York City boroughs, and presented
maps illustrating the operation of covenants. At the conclusion of this
phase of the conference, a committee was appointed to coordinate the
preparation of sociological studies. The conferees moved on to the ques-
tion of amicus briefs, and, after identifying the interested organizations, a
committee to coordinate the amicus briefs was formed.97
The conferees then debated the merits of various legal strategies and
theories. George Vaughn began the discussion with his analysis of the
state action question and his belief that the covenants violated the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Several of the conferees disagreed, citing the Corri-
gan decision.98 This meeting was the final major conference prior to the
arguments before the Supreme Court.99
XII. THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION'S ROLE IN THE RESTRICTIVE
COVENANT CASES
In September, 1946, an ad hoc committee formed by the NAACP met
with President Truman and requested that he take some action against
the increasing episodes of violence against minority citizens. President
Truman responded by issuing an executive order establishing the Presi-
dent's Committee on Civil Rights. The order authorized the Committee
to determine what governmental actions could be taken to protect the
civil rights of minority citizens and to prepare a written report of its
attorneys come to this meeting after having given considerable thought to the manner in
which they believe that the issues should be presented to the Supreme Court.
Letter from Thurgood Marshall, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, New York to vari-
ous individuals and groups (July 11, 1947).
95. Minutes of Meeting of NAACP Lawyers and Consultants on Matters, New York (Sept. 5,
1947).
96. Vaughn began with a brief description of the Shelley litigation. Graves followed with a
summary of McGhee v. Sipes. After Graves concluded, Leon A. Ransom described an Ohio case,
Trustees of Monroe Ave. Baptist Church v. Perkins. Phineas Indritz (who had assisted Houston in
the appeals of the District of Columbia cases) concluded the case summaries with a brief description
of Hurd v. Hodge and Urciolo v. Hodge. Id.
97. Id.
98. See discussion of Corrigan supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
99. Minutes, supra note 95.
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findings."°
To accomplish its mandate, the committee hired a fourteen-member
professional staff which reported to Professor Robert Carr, a recognized
civil rights authority. Between January and September 1947, the com-
mittee held numerous public meetings where it received testimony from
representatives of a broad range of interested groups. The committee
issued a report, To Secure These Rights, in October, 1947.101 Among the
forty recommendations included in the report were three addressing
problems related to restrictive covenants. One proposed the enactment
of state laws outlawing racial covenants. Another suggested that Con-
gress enact similar laws governing the District of Columbia. The third
recommendation suggested the Justice Department's direct intervention
in pending litigation.
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the restrictive covenant
cases, President Truman, Attorney General Tom Clark, and Solicitor
General Philip Perlman received numerous requests from individuals
and organizations opposed to the covenants urging the Administration to
submit an amicus brief. One day after the President's Commission on
Civil Rights issued To Secure These Rights, the Truman administration
decided to file an amicus brief challenging the validity of the covenants.
This was the first time that the federal government submitted an amicus
brief in a civil rights case.
XIII. FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUPREME COURT
In addition to securing support from the Truman administration, the
restrictive covenant opponents had the support of several organizations
that planned to file briefs in support of the NAACP. During the New
York conference, Houston identified representatives of fourteen separate
groups that attended the meetings and planned to file amicus briefs.
These included: the National Bar Association, the American Jewish
Congress, the Protestant Council of New York City, the Japanese Ameri-
can Citizens League, the Anti-Defamation League, the American Civil
Liberties Committee, the Black Elks, the Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations, the Anti-Nazi League, the National Lawyers Guild, the Board of
Home Missions of the Congregational Church, the American Indian As-
sociation and the American Indian Council.
100. PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE ON CiviL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS (1947).
101. Id.
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The roster of organizations demonstrates that the groups opposing re-
strictive covenants had grown to include religious and racial minorities,
who were themselves frequently the victims of restrictive covenants, or-
ganized labor, liberal public interest groups and the federal government.
Some efforts were made to coordinate the briefs because of a concern that
the court should not be flooded with too many briefs.1 2 It appears, how-
ever, that eventually the attorneys handling the covenant cases consented
to all requests to file amicus briefs. 10 3
Another element of the final preparations involved practice sessions at
Howard Law School. Since 1935, before each appearance in the
Supreme Court, the NAACP's lawyers presented their arguments at
Howard Law School in major practice sessions. These were arduous, all
day rehearsals at the law school, in which the lawyers practiced their
arguments before a simulated Supreme Court panel which consisted of
Howard Law professors. Each professor adopted the persona of a spe-
cific Supreme Court Justice, raising questions that might be raised during
the actual argument. Law students formed the audience and were en-
couraged to ask questions as well. Dean Johnson arranged a rehearsal
for the Shelley argument. It is said that a second year student-to the
groans of his peers-asked a long, rambling question but was vindicated
when the same point was raised on oral argument, almost verbatim, by
Justice Frankfurter."'
Another important aspect in the preparation of the restrictive cove-
nant cases was the NAACP's coordination of the publication of addi-
tional legal commentary questioning the legality of restrictive covenants,
as well as sociological studies demonstrating the negative effect of restric-
tive covenants. A number of books and articles appeared independently
of the NAACP's efforts. Others, however, were the direct result of the
102. During the New York meeting, Governor Hastie warned that too many briefs of uneven
quality might not be helpful and he recommended the formation of a committee to coordinate the
amici. Minutes, supra note 95.
103. Amicus briefs supporting the petitioners were filed by the Civil Liberties Department;
Grand Lodge of Elks; I.B.P.O.E.W.; the Protestant Council of New York City; American Federa-
tion of Labor; the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League to Champion Human Rights, Inc.; the General
Council of Congregational Christian Churches; the National Lawyers Guild; the Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations; the American Veterans Committee; the American Jewish Congress; the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee; the American Indian Citizens League of California, Inc.; the American Civil
Liberties Union; the National Bar Association; the American Association for the United Nations;
and the American Unitarian Association.
104. G. MCNEILL, supra note 22, at 162; personal recollection of Professor Gerald Dunne of
conversation with Herman Wilier 1960, see infra note 147.
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New York meeting. 105 Although none of these was cited in the Supreme
Court opinion, they were appended as exhibits to briefs that were filed by
the parties and the various amici. It is reasonable to conclude that these
publications had a substantial influence on the Supreme Court's decision.
XIV. THE COMPOSITION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN 1948
Three of the nine Supreme Court Justices did not participate in the
covenant cases decision. Justices Jackson, Reed and Rutledge recused
themselves. No official reason was given but it was widely assumed that
they lived in homes that were subject to restrictive covenants. To appre-
ciate the Court's decision in the restrictive covenant cases, it may be use-
ful to consider the backgrounds of the six justices who decided the cases.
The Chief Justice, Frederick Vinson, was born into a poor family in
105. H. LONG & C. JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERTY, RACE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN
HOusING (1947); Dean, None Other Than Caucasian, 86 ARCH. F. 16 (1947); Groner and Helfeld,
Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 YALE L.J. 426 (1948); Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments Against injuries inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAW. GUILD REV. 627
(1946); Jones, Legality of Race Housing Restrictive Covenants, 4 NAT'L. BAR. J. 14 (1946); Miller,
The Power of Restrictive Covenants Directed Against Purchase or Occupancy of Land by Negroes, 62
AM. CITY 103 (1947); Miller, Race Restrictions on Ownership or Occupancy of Land, 7 LAW. GUILD
REV. 99 (1947); Miller, Covenants of Exclusion, 36 SURV. GRAPHIC 541 (1947); Moore, Anti-Negro
Restrictive Covenants and Judicial Enforcement and Constitutional State Action under the Fourteenth
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Kentucky in 1890, where his father worked as a county jailer.'0 6 After
completing his legal education at Center College in 1911, he served as
city attorney and later as commonwealth attorney.'07 In 1923, Vinson
was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as a Democrat and
served until 1938.10 s During this period, he gained a reputation as a
staunch supporter of New Deal policies and became good friends with
then Senator Harry Truman.'0 9 As continuing rewards for Vinson's
political support, Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him to the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1938, to the Office of
Economic Stabilization in 1943, and as Director of War Mobilization
and Reconversion in 1945.110 After acceding to the presidency in 1945,
Truman appointed Vinson Secretary of the Treasury, and in 1946, he
nominated him to the Supreme Court as its Chief Justice. 1 Vinson be-
lieved that the federal government needed broad powers to handle the
problems of a complex society, and he was convinced that the Court's
function was to protect constitutional principles while still respecting the
judgment of citizens and their elected representatives.' 12 Although Vin-
son moved cautiously in cases involving race discrimination, his concern
for the equal treatment of all citizens'13 contributed to his participation
in the unanimous decision of the Court in the restrictive covenant cases.
Harold Burton was born in 1888 to a religious Unitarian family that
lived in a small town outside of Boston, Massachusetts. 14 Following his
graduation from Harvard Law School in 1912, he practiced in Cleveland,
Ohio, until he entered the Army five years later.11 In 1929, he was
elected to the Ohio* House of Representatives, and became mayor of
Cleveland in 1931. In 1940, he was elected to the U.S. Senate." 6 Burton
developed a close friendship with President Truman during his tenure in
106. See, e.g., 7 R. MAYER, THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE COURT AND THE
AMERICAN CRISES, 1930-1952, at 259 (1987).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, eg., 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR
LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2640 (L. Friedman & F. Israel ed. 1969) [hereinafter JUSTICES],
111. See, e.g,, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 345 (S. Elliott
ed. 1986) [hereinafter REFERENCE GUIDE].
112. R. MAYER, supra note 106, at 260.
113. JUSTICES, supra note I10, at 2643.
114. R. MAYER, supra note 106, at 256.
115. Id. at 256-57.
116. JUSTICES, supra note 110, at 2617.
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the Senate, resulting in his nomination to the Supreme Court in 1945.117
Commentators believe that Justice Burton participated in the Court's
cautious advance into race relations not out of personal philosophical
convictions, but based on his belief in the free flow of commerce." 8
Given the economic, as well as the sociological, impact that racial restric-
tive covenants had on the housing market, it is not surprising that Bur-
ton supported the Court's bar on their enforcement.
Hugo Black, the eighth child of an Alabama farmer, was born in a log
cabin in 1886.119 At seventeen he entered medical school but left to at-
tend law school at the University of Alabama, where he graduated with
honors.' 2° During his early years, Black's philosophy was shaped to a
great extent by his family and rural environment. That his family had
once been poor instilled him with a sympathy for the lower classes. In
addition, Alabama was the center of the populist movement. Black
worked for a while as typesetter for that organization's newsletter. 121 Af-
ter law school, Black attempted to build his Birmingham law practice by
joining such organizations as the Masons, the Knights of Pythias, the
Oddfellows, the local baptist church, and, to his later embarrassment, the
Ku Klux Klan.' 22 He also took a part time job as a police court judge
for the city of Birmingham where he gained a reputation for being fair
and kind to the poor and black defendants who were brought before his
court. In 1914, Black became a county prosecuting attorney and he
served in that capacity until 1917, when he joined the Army. 123 Follow-
ing the war he was elected to the Senate as the poor man's candidate. He
served until 1937, when Franklin Roosevelt appointed him to the
Supreme Court. 124 Black's opinions reflect a strong commitment to civil
liberties, especially free speech and fair criminal procedures. His sup-
port for the rights of black Americans, as evidenced during his tenure as
police court judge, significantly contributed to his conclusion that the
case for equal access to housing was strong.1 25
117. Id. at 2618.
118. R. MAYER, supra note 106, at 258.
119. Id. at 232.
120. Id. at 232-33.
121. JusTIcEs, supra note 110, at 2323.
122. See, e.g., JUSTICES, supra note 110, at 2324; see also G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE
JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 97-98 (1977) (discussing Black's actions on the police court).
123. REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 111, at 256.
124. JuSTICES, supra note 110, at 2329; see also G. DUNNE, supra note 122, at 256-59 (discuss-
ing the conflict between Black and Frankfurter over due process).
125. R. MAYER, supra note 106, at 234.
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Felix Frankfurter was born in Vienna in 1882 and emigrated to the
United States with his parents when he was twelve years old.' 26 His edu-
cation began in Europe and culminated with a law degree from Harvard
in 1906. He was appointed to serve as Assistant U.S. Attorney in the
Southern District of New York. 127 In 1914, he became a member of the
faculty at Harvard Law School. 2 8 In 1932, he refused an appointment
to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, and a year later, he declined Presi-
dent Roosevelt's offer to appoint him Solicitor General. During the
1930s, Frankfurter established a strong friendship with President
Roosevelt that eventually led to his 1939 appointment to the Supreme
Court.29 Although Frankfurter was criticized for his increasingly con-
servative decisions and his dedication to the philosophy of judicial re-
straint, 130 he joined the Court's stand against the enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants.
William Douglas was born in 1898 in Minnesota. His father, a Presby-
terian missionary, died when Douglas was six years old, leaving the fam-
ily so poverty stricken that Douglas had to go to work to help the family
survive.131 After graduation from Whitman College in 1916, he served in
the Army and worked as a high school teacher to earn tuition money for
law school. 132 In 1922, Douglas hitchhiked across the country, staying
in "hobo jungles" along the way, then entered Columbia Law School in
the fall of that year.' 33 Douglas graduated second in his class and se-
cured a teaching position at Columbia in 1926. In 1929, he joined the
faculty at Yale. 134 In 1934, he was appointed to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission where he became friends with President Roosevelt
and established himself as a New Dealer.' 35 This led to his nomination
to the Supreme Court in 1939.136 Douglas quickly gained a reputation as
the Court's foremost liberal, and his concern for the underprivileged con-
tributed to his support in the Shelley decision.
126. JusTicEs, supra note 110, at 2402.
127. Id.
128. R. MAYER, supra note 106, at 239.
129. JUSTICES, supra note 110, at 2404-06.
130. Id. at 2416-17; see also Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 357-412 (1949).
131. JusTicEs, supra note 110, at 2448.
132. Id.
133. R. MAYER, supra note 106, at 242.
134. REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note I 11, at 280.
135. Id.
136. Id. Douglas replaced Justice Louis Brandeis.
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Frank Murphy was born in 1890, to an Irish Catholic family in a small
town outside Detroit, Michigan.137 His father was a lawyer and his fam-
ily was relatively affluent. This economic security allowed him to study
in Europe following his graduation from the University of Michigan Law
School. 138 After he returned to America, he was appointed to serve as an
Assistant U.S. Attorney in Detroit and was later nominated to the re-
corder's court. 139 During this period, Murphy developed a reputation
for being a champion of the underprivileged."4 In 1930, he was elected
mayor of Detroit. He supported President Roosevelt's election and was
rewarded with an appointment as governor general of the Philippines.141
As governor general, Murphy was an extremely popular humanitarian.
He helped the Philippines become the first Asian country to allow wo-
men the right to vote.'4 2 In 1936, he was elected governor of Michi-
gan. 143 After an unsuccessful reelection bid, Murphy accepted an
appointment as attorney general of the United States, and in 1940, Presi-
dent Roosevelt appointed him to the Supreme Court."4 Murphy only
reluctantly accepted, due to his desire to serve as Secretary of War. 145
Although he generally agreed with President Roosevelt's policies, Mur-
phy demonstrated his independence when he opposed Roosevelt in the
War Crimes Trial and in cases involving wartime control of Hawaii and
Truman's handling of a coal strike. 146
XV. ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court allotted seven hours for oral argument which took
place on January 15 and 16, 1948. The Solicitor General received one
hour and three hours were allotted to each side. For the petitioners,
George Vaughn and Herman Willer argued the St. Louis case, Charles
Houston and Phineas Indritz argued the District of Columbia cases, and
Thurgood Marshall and Loren Miller argued the Detroit case. For the
respondents, Gerald Seegers appeared in the St. Louis case, and Henry
137. Id. at 244.
138. Id. at 244-45.
139. JusTICES, supra note 110, at 2496.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2497.
142. Id.
143. REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 111, at 320.
144. Id.
145. JUSTICES, supra note 110, at 2500.
146, R. MAYER, supra note 106, at 245-46.
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Gilligan and James Crooks represented the white property owners from
Detroit and Washington, 147 respectively.
The argument was opened by Solicitor General Philip Perlman. Perl-
man relied on the report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights in
his attack against the evils of restrictive covenants. Their enforcement,
he told the Court, hampered the federal government's ability to perform
its obligations in the areas of public health, housing, home finance, and
foreign affairs. Perlman urged the Justices to declare covenants contrary
to public policy and unconstitutional. Perlman also claimed that en-
forcement of restrictive covenants constituted state action.148
Argument in the St. Louis case followed. George Vaughn presented
the argument. He repeated the state action theory and stressed his claim
that the judicial enforcement of the covenants violated the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.149 Vaughn characterized racially restrictive covenants as
"the Achilles heel" of American democracy.' 50 In what observers re-
member as the most dramatic point in the seven hours of argument,
Vaughn, the son of a slave, stated, in a voice that reverberated through
the corridors of the Court, that the "Negro knocks at America's door
and cries, 'Let me come in and sit by the fire. I helped build the
house.' "151 Vaughn followed his words about "America's door" by rap-
ping the counsel table. The sound of his knuckles striking wood reso-
nated through the silent courtroom and supplied a climax to his
argument that mere words never could.1 52
Gerald Seegers, the attorney for the white homeowners in St. Louis,
contended that the Court should disregard the sociological and political
claims of his opponents. He acknowledged that the question was impor-
tant, and that the decision would affect the lives of millions of citizens.
Seegers stressed, however, that "this is a lawsuit, this is a court of law
147. Herman Wilier was a St. Louis attorney who had been recruited by Vaughn to assist with
the Supreme Court case. Phineas Indritz was an assistant solicitor with the Department of Labor
who assisted Houston with the District of Columbia cases. Loren Miller of Los Angeles, California,
who had handled numerous restrictive covenant cases, including Hansberry v. Lee, was a black
attorney and member of the NAACP's legal committee.
148. Arguments Before the Court: Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants, 16 U.S.L.W. 3219
(Jan. 20, 1948) [hereinafter Arguments].
149. Id. at 3219-20.
150. Id. at 3220.
151. Id.
152. Personal recollection of Professor Dunne of conversation with Herman Wilier (1960). Her-
man Wilier followed Vaughn with a summation of the primary legal arguments.
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and the problems before the Court are legal ones."' 5 3 He went on to
argue that the problems of race discrimination "cannot be solved by judi-
cial decrees and the current housing problem is no justification for a judi-
cial amendment of the Constitution."1 54
The Michigan case was argued by Loren Miller and Thurgood Mar-
shall. They argued that the State of Michigan denied the black petition-
ers their constitutional right to occupy residential property and that the
court's order was state action contrary to the fourteenth amendment.155
Thurgood Marshall referred to the sociological data contained in the
briefs and urged the Court to weigh the effects of racial segregation on
housing problems, crime, and disease. At that point, Justice Frankfurter
asked: "What's the relevance of all this material? If you are right about
the legal proposition, the sociological material merely shows how it
works. If you're wrong, this material doesn't do you any good."' 5 6 Mar-
shall agreed that it was not necessary to rely upon it, but that it had legal
significance and was essential in the District of Columbia cases where the
state action theory was not applicable. There, he continued, the question
of public policy was basic and the social and economic data should be an
ingredient in any decision relating to the wisdom of enforcing restrictive
covenants.1 57 Justice Frankfurter agreed that the sociological material
might be of some legal significance, especially in the the District of Co-
lumbia cases. 58
Charles Houston followed with the District of Columbia cases. His
argument focused on the record in those cases and pointed out that there
had been no racial conflict in the neighborhoods involved. Houston also
discussed the sociological material, 59 and he referred to Hodge's remark
that she would rather live next door to a white criminal than a distin-
guished black person."6
Henry Gilligan and James Crooks, the attorneys for the white home-
owners, responded. Gilligan stressed that the established policy of the
courts of the District supported racially restrictive covenants. He re-
minded the Court that it had recently denied certiorari in similar restric-
153. Arguments, supra note 148 at 3220.
154. Id. at 3220-21.
155. Id. at 3221.
156. Id. at 3222.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 3223.
160. Id. Phineas Indritz also appeared for the District of Columbia petitioners.
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tive covenant cases. This, he contended, had established "the right of
citizens to live in homes in a neighborhood of their own selection un-
hampered by the dealings of greedy real estate speculators posing as
friends of the Negroes."' 161  After Crooks and Gilligan concluded,
Charles Houston appeared briefly in rebuttal to emphasize that "racism
in the United States must stop."' 62 He discussed the housing problems
of veterans and Japanese Americans to illustrate how the housing prob-
lem had become the focal point of a struggle between powerful economic
groups and minorities. He asked the Supreme Court to rule that judicial
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was invalid and concluded
with the argument that "the courts, by making racial unity impossible,
are endangering national security." 163
XVI. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. The St. Louis and Detroit Cases
In May, 1948, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Shelley and
McGhee."6 Chief Justice Vinson delivered the Court's opinion. After a
recitation of the underlying facts, the Court began its legal analysis with
a statement that emphasized that it was considering, for the first time,
the question of whether the fourteenth amendment prohibits judicial en-
forcement of restrictive covenants based on race or color.' 65 The Court
distinquished Corrigan on the grounds that it did not involve the four-
teenth amendment and did not address the validity of judicial enforce-
ment of covenants. According to the Court, the only constitutional issue
addressed in Corrigan was the validity of covenant agreements as such.166
The Court distinguished Hansberry, with an explanation that, in that
case, the Court held only that petitioners had been denied due process
when they were estopped from challenging the validity of a covenant
agreement by a judgment entered in a prior suit to which petitioners had
not been joined as parties.
After noting that, since the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,167 the Court
had consistently held that the fourteenth amendment "erects no shield
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
165. Id. at 8.
166. Id. at 8-9.
167. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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against private conduct however discriminatory or wrongful," 168 the
Court directed its discussion to a consideration of the types of state ac-
tion involved in Buchanan and other decisions involving direct action by
legislatures. In those cases, the Court said, state action was clearly in-
volved because the challenged actions involved statutes or ordinances
that were enacted by legislative bodies. Shelley, in contrast, involved
"patterns of discrimination, and the areas in which the restrictions are to
operate are determined... among private individuals." 169
Because the state's involvement in this case was limited to the enforce-
ment of private agreements, the critical question involved a determina-
tion of whether judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenants was
"state action" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. The Court an-
swered that question in the affirmative: "That the action of state courts
in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the state within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a proposition which has
long been established by the decisions of this court."17
After citing a number of cases in which the actions of state courts were
held unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment, the Court rea-
soned that the fourteenth amendment was not restricted to situations in
which the judicial proceedings were themselves found to be procedurally
unfair. Relying on the holding in American Federation of Labor v.
Swing, 171 the Court stated that judicial enforcement of a common-law
right may violate the fourteenth amendment even where the judicial pro-
ceedings were themselves in complete accord with the most rigorous
standards of procedural due process. As a result, the Court concluded
that the "state action" contemplated by the fourteenth amendment "in-
cludes actions of state courts and state judicial officials."' 172
Proceeding from that conclusion, the Court reasoned further that
there had "been state action in these cases in the full and complete sense
of the phrase."' 173 Supporting this determination, the Court observed
that, without the intervention of the state courts, the black families in-
volved in Shelley and McGhee would have been free to occupy the
properties in question without interruption. The Court believed that it
168. 334 U.S. at 13.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
172. 334 U.S. at 18.
173. Id. at 19.
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did not matter that the state's involvement arose from a private agree-
ment because "the Fourteenth Amendment refers to exertions of state
power in all forms."174
The Court then turned to the contentions of the respondents that there
was no denial of equal protection because black families were free to exe-
cute covenants prohibiting the sales of properties to whites, and they
were equally free to secure judicial enforcement of such covenants. The
Court exposed the disingenuous nature of this argument by observing
that there had never been a reported instance in which a black family had
attempted to exclude a white family from a black neighborhood. On a
more substantive note, the Court stated that, "[e]qual protection of the
law is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."'175
For these reasons, the Court concluded that "in granting judicial en-
forcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the states have
denied petitioners equal protection of the laws."' 76
B. The District of Columbia Cases
The decision in the consolidated companion cases to Shelley and Mc-
Ghee, Hurd v. Hodge and Urciolo v. Hodge,'77 was also issued on May 3,
1948. Because the Hodge cases involved properties located in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the arguments relied primarily on the fifth amend-
ment, which applies to actions taken by the federal government, instead
of the fourteenth amendment.
To everyone's surprise, the Court "found it unnecessary to resolve the
constitutional issue which the petitioners advance; for we have found ju-
dicial enforcement of restrictive covenants by the courts of the District of
Columbia improper for other reasons. ' 1 8 The other reason was a provi-
sion of a District of Columbia statute which was enacted at the same
time and was virtually identical to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
statute, Section 1978 of the Revised Statutes, required that "citizens of
the United States shall have the same rights as enjoyed by white citizens
.to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real property."' 179
The Court determined in Hodge that the black purchasers, because of
174. Id. at 20.
175. Id. at 23.
176. Id.
177. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
178. Id. at 30.
179. Id. at 30-31.
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their race, had been subjected to court orders which divested them of
their titles to the properties in question. As a result, the federal courts of
the District of Columbia had denied the petitioners in the Hodge cases
their statutory rights because they had not accorded them the same
rights as white citizens to "purchase, hold and convey real property."' 80
The Court also held that, even if there had been no statute, judicial en-
forcement of the restrictive covenants "is judicial action contrary to the
public policy of United States." For these reasons, the Court held that
racial covenants were not enforceable in the District of Columbia.
18 1
XVII. CONCLUSION
The real issue in the Shelley cases was stated in the brief for the peti-
tioners. They argued that the litigation was "not a matter of enforcing
an isolated private agreement. It is a test as to whether we have a united
nation or a country divided into areas and ghettoes solely along racial
and religious lines."' 82 To some degree, therefore, the Supreme Court's
decision in the restrictive covenant cases was inevitable. The redistribu-
tion of the black population from rural to urban areas, and the availabil-
ity of jobs in a growing industrial economy, assured that the rapid
growth of black populations in cities could not be contained physically
within the tiny districts to which they were confined by the covenants.
The economics of real estate transactions played a role as well. The
law of supply and demand was in operation to the extent that white
homeowners found, in many cases, that they could sell their homes to a
black family for a higher price than they would have received if they sold
to a white family. The real estate brokers earned their usual fees and
commissions, and as witnessed in the St. Louis transaction, tremendous
profits could be made through "straw" transactions.
The most significant influence may have been the change in the intel-
lectual community's perceptions of black citizens. By the 1940s, studies
had proven beyond doubt that the notion of inherent inferiority was sci-
entifically baseless. Sociological studies demonstrated the same thesis
but showed further the negative impact of segregation on black and white
Americans. During the 1920s, when Buchanan was decided, this was not
180. Id. at 34.
181. In a one-page concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter added that general equitable princi-
ples of good conscience provided "a sufficient and conclusive ground for reaching the Court's re-
sult." Id. at 36.
182. Brief for Petitioner McGhee at 90, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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the case. Although there is no textual support for this conclusion in the
Court's opinion, it seems likely that these external influences had a signif-
icant impact on the Supreme Court's decision. The trials of the four
cases, the decisions issued by the appellate courts, and the evolution of
the covenant cases as a whole suggest strongly that there was much more
to Shelley than the Supreme Court's opinion indicates.
From a historical perspective, the restrictive covenant cases are signifi-
cant because they set the stage for the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in
Brown v. Board of Education."3 The Court's opinion in the Shelley cases
does not mention any of the extensive sociological and scientific studies
that were appended to the briefs but the most compelling arguments were
based on those materials. As the reviews of the school desegregation
cases have shown, similar sociological and scientific data were the key
ingredients in the Supreme Court's decision to reverse the Plessey 84 de-
cision. Hence, the 1954 decision in Brown is in this regard directly attrib-
utable to the NAACP's success in the Shelley cases.
The restrictive covenant cases stand as a monument to the NAACP's
organizational skills and the courage and persistence of that group's law-
yers. Beginning with the successful challenge to legislated segregation in
Buchanan, continuing through the 1926 loss to private discrimination in
Corrigan and throughout the twenty-two years of litigation that followed,
the NAACP's fight against discrimination in housing did not abate until
it prevailed in the Supreme Court. It is said that the Harlem renaissance
of the 1920s was the outstanding period for black writers and artists.
There was undoubtedly a renaissance at Howard Law School for black
lawyers in the 1940s.
183. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (reversing the 'seperate but equal' doctrine of
Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
184. Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (establishing separate but equal doctrine).
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